It cannot be said that the same hard core of studies exists in the philosophy of science. In this domain, there are no definite results of the sort which exist in logic. It is impossible to think of analogies to Goedel's results on consistency and completeness, Tarski's definition of truth, or Church's proof that there is no decision procedure for the restricted predicate calculus.
The main purpose of this paper is to outline a partial program for such a hard core of studies in the philosophy of science. For reasons of space, I restrict myself t o two general areas: scientific theories and the theory of measurement. My thesis is that under these two headings it is not d a c u l t t o lay out a serious program of research for which scientifically-minded philosophers seem peculiarly suited. 1. Scientific theories. During the past two or three decades positivistic philosophers have written a great deal about the structure of scientific theories. Recently, they have been particularly concerned to give a general account of empirical meaningfulness which jibes with their account of this structure? Although many precise and interesting philosophical distinctions have been made in the course of these investigations, there has been little if any attempt 1 I am grateful to Professor Donald Davidson and Mrs. Muriel Winet for several helpful suggestions. This paper was read at the 1953 meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association.
a For a review of the literature, see Hempel (11) and (12) . 242 by philosophers working in the positivistic tradition to give a detailed analysis of particular scientific theories. Working along different lines, some physicists and mathematicians have been interested in becoming clearer about the foundations of various particular branches of physics (for example, Mach (171, Hamel (g), (lo), Frank (6), Lindsay and Margenau (15)). Scientists working in other domains have had similar int,erests concerning their disciplines. There are, for instance, writings by biologists on the foundations of biology (for example, Woodger (29) and (30), and writin@ by economists on the foundations of economics (for example, Arrow (2), Fraser (7), Little (16) , and Robbins (23)). If we take the literature on the foundations of physics as an example, we rather soon reach the conclusion that physicists are not well suited to the task of serious research in foundations. The main difficulty is that working scientists are seldom sensitive to questions which seem to be of a purely formal or mathematical character. An excellent example is the many discussions concerning the definition of mass in classical mechanics. Mach (17; pp. 264-277) proposed to define the relative mass of two bodies as the inverse ratio of their '(mutually induced" accelerations when they are isolated from other bodies.s Mach's suggestion is ordinarily discussed as if he were giving a definition in the ordinary formal sense, M, for example, when we define the relation of less than between two real numbers x and y as the relation which holds if and only there is a positive real number z such that
Yet it is easy to show that for nearly any reasonable axiomatization of classical mechanics, the notion of masß cannot be defined in terms of the other notions? On the other hand, if we think of Mach's ideas as suggesting a "coordinating definition," i.e., a statement of how empirically to apply the theoretical notion of mms, the condit.ion of isolation required of the bodies renders his proposal useless. The only reasonable alternative seems to be to regard bis idea as a suggestive heuristic way of thinking about an empirically elusive concept. The end result is that neither theoretical nor experimental physics has been seriously clarified by Mach's discussion.
From the standpoint of making progress in foundations, one of the most important requirements is clearly to separate theory from experiment. For concerning. a precise rational reconstruction of the experimental portion of any science, there seem to be some extremely difficult problems, about which more shall be mid later. But in the area of theory, the road is unimpaired and wide open. The basic method of attack is axiomatization in the standard mathematical sense. Yet ~t s
Hempel has apt.ly remarked (13; p. Sl), at present "the conception of scientSc theories as presented in axiomatized form is an idealization made for purposes of logical clarification and rational reconstruction. Actual attempts to axiomatize theories of empirical science have so far been rare".
My first general programmatic proposal is that philosophers of science set a A more recent discussion of Rhch's idea is to be found in Lindsay and Margensu (15), themselves the task of axiomatizing the theory of all developed branches of empirical science. I do not have time here to review the many interesting philosophical consequences of such axiomat,ic but to the philosopher who asks "Why axiomatize?", I may briefly say that axiomatization is one constructive way of obt,aining the sort of intellectual clarity and precision for which philosophers are always striving with respect t,o the foundations of the various sciences. Unfortunately a good many philosophers seem to labor under the raisimpression that t.0 axiomatize a scientific discipline, or a branch of mathematics, one needs to formalize the discipline in some well-defined artificial language. Thus, it is maintained that in axiomatsizing classical particle mechanics %Fe should begin by providing a recursive definition of the notion of being a sentence of part,icle mechanics. This kind of linguistic viewpoint is, in my opinion, seriously in error, and the predominance of this attitude has perhaps been one of the major reasons for the lack of substantial positive results in the philosophy of science. FlThen we turn to any branch of science which uses mathematics in a seriow way, me clearly do not want t,o formalize a language for this branch of science. The practical folly of such formalization is testified to by the fact that the branches of mathematics needed for physics have not, been formalized, and t'he philosopher intent on formalizing mechanics, for instance, would first have t,o formalize not only the differential and integral calculus, but also the theory of matrices, the theory of ordinary and partial differential equations, and a good port'ion of the theory of functions of a real variable.
Luckily we can pursue a program of axiomatization without constructing any formal languages. The viewpoint I am advocating is that the basic methods appropriate for axiomatic studies in the empirical sciences are not metamathematical (and thus syntactical and semantical), but set-theoretical. To axiomatize the theory of a particular branch of empirical science in the Sense I am advocating is t o give a definition of a set-theoretical notion, such as that of a system of classical particle mechanics, (see McKinsey, Sugar, a,nd Suppes (B)), or th& of a system of rigid body mechanics (see Adams (l)), or that of a system of Mendelian genetics (see Rubin (24) ). The methods used in giving such a. definition are precisely similar to those used in modern mat,hematics to define such notions as t,hone of a lattice, an algebraic ring, or a Hilbert space. We may, of course, envisage a formalization of set theory and consequently a formalization within one language of the theoretical portion of all branches of empirical science. However, there exists at present no formalization of set t,heory sufficiently developed to include the various branches of mathematics already ment.ioned. In practice, we achieve a sufficient degree of rigor and clarity by using without. formalization t,hose branches of mathematics necessary to the development of the empirical sciences. And our basic set-theoretical framework may be handled in m intuitive way.6
See ?\leKinsey and Suppes (19) for general remarks; some special applications t o problems in the theory of meaning are t o be found in McKinsey and Suppes (20).
This is not to deny the great significance of axiomatic set theory for the foundations of mathernaties. It is simply expedient to use intuitive set theory when studying the founda-The work connected with axiomatization in the sense of giving a set-theoretical definition of the fundamental notions of a given branch of empirical science may be divided into four parts. First, there needs to be a statement of what other theories will be assumed. For example, in axiomatizing rigid body mechanics, it is convenient not only to assume the standard branches of mathematics, but also particle mechanics. Second, the primitive notions of the theory need to be listed, and tsheir set-theoret,ical character indicat,ed. In particle mechanics, for example, we need such primitive notions as the set of particles, the interval of elapsed times, the position function, and the mass function (for further details, see McKinsey, Sugar, and Suppes (18)). Third, the setAheoretica1 definition needs to be completed by listing the axioms which must be sat,isfied. We are then in 8 posit,ion to investigate the deductive consequences of our definition. One of the main tasks is rationally to reconstruct the standard theorems for the branch of science at hand. Also, with such an axiomatization available we may ask the kind of quest,ions characteristic of modern mathematics; for example, what sort of representation theorems can be proved. We may mention that the problem of reductionism, so much discussed in recent years by philosophers, seems most appropriately studied by searching for representation theorems. If a representation theorem may be found for one branch of science in terms of a second, we may properly say that the first has been reduced to t.he second? Fourth and Gnally, an empirical interpretation of the axiomatized theory needs t.0 be given. This is the topic t.0 which I now wish t o turn, indicating along t.he way how set-theheoretica,l and axiomatic methods are useful even in this ultraempirical domain.
2.
Theory of measurement. The relation between scientific theory and experiment is a vast and complicated subject,, a,nd its precise analysis seems t o be an exceedingly difficult problem. There has been a great deal of discussion of this problem in the literature of the philosophy of science, but there has also been a lament,able lack of systematic progress. Carnap's discussion (4) of reduction sentences is one of the most substantial contributions, but he does not attempt a detailed analysis of any one branch of physics, and so far as I know, no such analysis exists in tfhe literature.8 When a theory such as classical particle mechanics is given in axiomatic form the problem reduces t o providing an empirical interpretation for the primitive notions or certain defined notions of the theory.
tions of the empirical sciences. With respect t o various branches of mathematics, formalization (in the seme of constructing an artificial language) is not necessary, but it is sometimes necessary rationally t o reconstruct mithin intuitive set theory certain mathematical domains. A good example is the need to reconst'ruct the theory of partial differential equat'ions for use in st,udying the foundations of mechanics. This mathematical discipline is ordinarily presented in a way that is entirely unsatisfactory from t,he standpoint of foundations.
7 As far as I know, the first (and as yet only) rigorous solution of a signiticsnt reduction problem is to be found in Adams (1) . He shows that in one suitable sense rigid body mechanics is reducible t o particle mechanics. 8 Experimental physics is much discussed, of course, by writers OR the foundation of physics, but I know of no detailed discussion which proceeds with any appreciable degree of logical precision.
PATRIC3 SUPPE3
Since in any advanced branch of science we are usually interested in the interpretation of quantitative notions, we soon find ourselves needing a systematic theory of measurement. The primary task of the theory of measurement would seem t o be to bridge the gap between qualitative observations (('This rod is longer than that one," "This pan of the balance is higher than the other one") and the quantitative assertions demanded in developed scientific theories "The length of this rod is 5.6 cm.," "The mass of this steel ball is 7.2 gm.9.
In other words, the theory of measurement should show us how we may legitimately pass from the rough and ready region of qualitative, common-sense observations to the precise and metrical realm of systematic science. Set-theoretical rather than linguistic or metamathematical methods seem to offer the best techniques for making this transition. There are already in the literature (Hoelder (14) , Nagel (21), von Neumann and Morgenstern (22), pp. 24-29, Hempel (13), Suppes (26), Suppes and Winet (2'7) several sets of axioms for measurement of different sorts. The aim of these axiomatizations is t o provide a kind of algebra of experimentally realizable operations and relations. Thus in studying the measurement of mass a natural sort of primitive notion is that of a relation C of coincidence such that xCy if and only if when body x is placed in one pan of a balance and body y in the ot.her, the arm of the balance will remain in horizontal equilibrium. The formal task is t o prove that the axioms laid down for the primitive notions indeed guarantee that measurement in the appropriate sense is forthcoming if the axioms are satisfied?
My second general programmatic proposal is that philosophers of science set themselves the task of developing empirically more realistic axiomatizations for various types of measurement.1°
To make a little more definit.e what I mean by '(empirically more realistic axiomatizations," we may consider an example. Every set of axioms for the measurement of mass assumes that the relation of coincidence mentioned above is transitive, and yet this is not the case for any actual balance. Now one might take the attitude that this axiom of transitivity is a harmless idealization, but in point of fact this assumption, together with one or two others of a similar character, has the embarrassing consequence that there must be an infinite number of distinct objects whose masses are to be measured, and perhaps even worse, that there must be indefinitely heavy objects. Certainly this consequence is scarcely compatible with the most obvious facts concerning the actual empirical practice of measuring mass.
In spite of a host of well-defined problems similar to the example concerning transitivity, there is in the vast literature on the theory of measurement only a mere scattering of well-deiined results. It seems to me that there is here a large field for cultivation by scientifically-minded philosophers. It must be admitted, however, that not all philosophers who have thought about the theory of measurement are in agreement with the view that the main task is the development of more realistic axiomatizations. But in my opinion such philosophers mistakenly think of axiomatization for various types of measurement as bekg on the same level with axiomatization of developed branches of science such as mechanics. In the latter case, idealization is useful in enhancing enormously the deductive consequences of the theory. But the theory of measurement has no correspondingly interesting deductive consequences. Its entire raison d'&tre is to provide a precise methodological analysis of empirical practices of measurement, and in so far as the theory grossly deviat,es from that which is feasible empirically, it surely is deficient.
If space had permitted, I would have devoted a third section to the application of set-theoretical methods to t.he theory of probability and induction. AIthough interesting results have been obtained in this domain by philosophers using the linguistic approach (Carnap (5), for example), there seems to be at least as much potentiality in the set-theoretical approach. Certainly the latter ca,n come much more rapidly to grips with the views which dominate modern statistics (see, for example, Wald (28), and Blackwell and Girschick (3)).
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